ABSTRACT. This paper reports on a study using the EARTH 
Introduction
This paper extends some of our earlier work that has dealt with the practice of Realpolitik within a multistate system and in particular on the effects of alternative decision-making processes. The focus here is on the state and systemic level consequences that derive from introducing the assumption that states have the ability to adapt their decision-making procedures. We represent adaptation as a higher level organizational process, one that might appropriately be called learning, and we will limit our inquiries here to two fundamental questions: ( 1 ) does learning (adaptation) significantly enhance the survival chances of states embedded in an anarchic system?; and (2) does learning (adaptation) affect the overall functioning of the system by improving upon the chances of preventing a hegemon from absorbing the entire system of states?
Our research agenda has combined two related elements: first, we have attempted to formalize many of the principal theses of realism within a model and, second, we have sought to assess the logical implications of the theses through experimental analyses conducted with a computer simulation model. Two broad concerns have shaped the writings and arguments of the Realists, the survival of individual states and the maintenance of pluralism within the system. These two have also guided our research efforts. For example, Stoll (1986) examined the consequences of geographical position, relative power, and power assessment abilities on the survival of individual states, and in a later study, Stoll (1987) went on to examine the potential for power balancing behavior to emerge in a Realist system and to assess the implications of this for the maintenance of system pluralism. Cusack and Zimmer (1989) examined the effects of a variety of structural conditions and policy propensities on the potential for multistate system endurance, and Cusack (1987 Cusack ( , 1989 ) also examined the implications for both state survival and system endurance of the use of alternative power management styles, as well as the effects of the cost of empire maintenance and resource allocation priorities on system endurance. Finally, Cusack and Stoll (1988) and Cusack (1987) studied the implications of the use of rational or expected utility decision logics on the survival chances of states and system endurance.
This paper continues our concern with the implications of alternative decisionmaking logics. We attempt to broaden that focus by positing the potential existence of adaptation on the part of states. Adaptation is represented as the occurrence of shifts between two different decision-making processes. It is based on two factors: (1) observed differences in the relative success that derives from the use of each process within the system, and (2) state level capacities to affect such a transition.
In the next section we address the theoretical importance of adaptation. Following that, we outline the basic structure of the model used in the analysis of this question and specify the structural changes that have been implemented in order to conduct this study. The fourth section lays out the experimental design of the study and provides an overview of the results generated by our experiments with the model. The last section provides a summary of the principal findings that have emerged from this study.
Adaptation and the Balance of Power System
The analogy of the market is often applied by students of world politics to the international system. Both are seen as predatory environments and, in both, a process of natural selection is thought to be one of the principal mechanisms that govern the character of the system and the survival chances of its inhabitants. For some, rational choice is a sine qua non for survival. Indeed, one of the main prescriptions that flow from Realist writing is the need for cool and rational calculation on (Cyert and March, 1963) . However, organizational form and functioning can change. They do so through a process whereby significant failure, detected by generating assessments in terms of absolute standards or comparisons with the performance of competitors, is signalled.
Taking this point further, Nelson and Winter (1982) Bremer and Mihalka (1977) . This model is a formalization of the &dquo;automatic stabilization&dquo; image of the balance of power system in a multistate system (Claude, 1962 (Bremer, 1980; Eberwein, 1982 (Cusack and Stoll, 1988) , the structure of the basic model has been modified to permit the representation of two different styles of decision making. These two styles are labelled, respectively, primitive power seeking and sophisticated power seeking.
The first style, primitive, is equivalent to that employed in the basic model as described above. Generally, a state endowed with this decision-making style bases its decisions on a single calculation: it estimates the amount of power available to its side and the amount available to the opponent's side. If it calculates that it is stronger than the opposition, thus indicating that it has a better than even chance of being the victor in a war and acquiring power from its opponent(s), it then will decide to join a conflict or to escalate it, depending on the particular point of the simulation requiring a decision.
In contrast, the sophisticated style reflects a greater awareness of the costs and benefits that derive from participation in a war. Since we wished to retain some ties to the primitive power seeking decision style so as to facilitate comparisons between the two, we implemented sophisticated power seeking as a two-step decision-making process. In the first step a sophisticated power seeker calculates the probability of victory for its side in a potential war. If it estimates that the probability is greater than 0.5, it moves to the second step of the process: but if the estimated probability is 0.5 or less, it neither joins nor escalates the conflict within which it is embedded. In the second step of the process, it calculates the expected power gains that would derive from winning the war and compares this to the gain that would accrue if it were to stay out of the war and acquire power simply through internal growth. If the gain from fighting a war is greater than that from non-participation, the state escalates the conflict; otherwise it does not.
As a run of the simulation is initialized, a parameter for the proportion of sophisticated power seekers in the system is input. On the basis of this parameter, the two decision-making styles are then randomly assigned to the initial 98 states in the system. Note that this fixes the decision-making style for the state until such time, if it is endowed with the ability to do so, that it makes a higher level choice to alter its mode of decision making (see below).
In the normal choice circumstances within the execution of the model-e.g., conflict initiation, joining alliances, conflict escalation-the decision-making style of the state is examined and the appropriate type of calculation is made. In detail, the calculations are as follows. The power estimation ability of the state plays a role. Power estimates are generated by multiplying the actual power value by a factor representing a combination of the power estimation ability of the state and a random component. This factor is obtained by drawing a normally distributed random number from a distribution with a mean equal to the state's power estimation ability, and a standard deviation equal to the parameter specified for the run.
The primitive power seeker makes power estimates for each side and compares the two. If it estimates its side's power as larger than the opponent, it opts for the escalatory choice, otherwise it does not. The sophisticated power seeker uses the two power estimates as input into a logistical function to calculate the probability of victory. This is the same function that is used in the simulation to determine the outcome of a war. Note that a probability of victory of 0.5 is equivalent to the two sides being equal in power; thus, using this threshold is the same as asking whether the state is on the more powerful side. If the probability based on the power estimate is greater than .5, then the sophisticated power seeker assesses the expected gains from winning the war. Using the power estimates for both sides, the state estimates the war fighting cost, the amount of power it will gain from the reparations paid by the losers, and the power it will gain from the territorial acquisitions it can expect to receive from the coalition leader of the losing side. This total is compared to the amount of power it would gain from staying out of the conflict and increasing its power at the internal growth rate. If (Cusack and Zimmer, 1989; Cusack and Stoll, 1988 The third set of varying conditions involved the adaptation frequency (i.e., the number of iterations between the evaluation of the relative success of the two decision-making styles). In one set of runs, the evaluation was conducted every 20 iterations, and in the other set, every 40 iterations. For all runs in which adaptation was allowed, one-third of the states had an adaptation probability of 0.0, one-third had an adaptation probability of .5, and one-third had an adaptation probability of 1.0.
In order to have a run with each of the 96 possible combinations of background condition and initial decision-making style, and to vary the adaptation frequency, a total of 192 (96 X 2) runs were necessary. Each of these adaptation runs was preceded by a run with the same background conditions and initial decision-making style (i.e., a total of 192 no adaptation runs-two runs for each combination of background condition and initial decision making style), but with no adaptation of decisionmaking style allowed.
The initial power value, power estimation value, and decision-making style randomly generated for Another difference between the two analyses is the weaker effect of the initial proportion of sophisticated power seekers on the duration of the system. All else being equal, sophisticated power seekers will engage in fewer wars than will primitive power seekers.' Thus, a system with a large proportion of sophisticated power seekers can be expected to experience less war, and therefore less attrition of states, than a system with a small proportion of sophisticated power seekers. This is the reason for the strong positive effect of the proportion in the runs with no adaptation. But in the adaptation runs, the proportion of sophisticated power seekers may decrease greatly after the success of decision-making styles is evaluated; it may also increase greatly as well. These large swings weaken the relationship between the initial proportion of sophisticated power seekers and the duration of the system.
The final difference in the results of Tables 1 and 2 Tables 3 and 4 . As with the system-level analysis, we will concentrate on the differences between the finding for the no adaptation and adaptation runs. But before moving to this discussion, we want to take note of one similarity between the two tables: the low fits of the equations. This is consistent with one of our earlier studies (Stoll, 1986) . We believe that the evolving dynamics of the system have a good deal to do with the life and death of particular states, and none of the measures employed in this study effectively reveal these dynamics.5
The first difference in the two analyses is the smaller negative impact of the standard deviation of power estimation ability on the survival of states in the adaptation runs; in fact, it has almost no effect in these runs. In general, a larger standard deviation means that states will make greater mistakes in their estimation, and pay the price with a disastrous war involvement. But if states are able to adapt their decision-making style to change to the style which has produced more success, this may to a certain extent cancel out the misestimation effect. (Cusack and Stoll, 1988 
